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This study examines impacts on net social benefits or 
economic welfare of alternative policy instruments for 
reducing traffic congestion and atmospheric emissions 
in São Paulo, Brazil. The study shows that expanding 
road networks, subsidizing public transit, and improving 
automobile fuel economy may not be as effective as 
suggested by economic theories because these policies 
could cause significant rebound effects. Although pricing 
instruments such as congestion tolls and fuel taxes 
would certainly reduce congestion and emissions, the 
optimal level of these instruments would steeply increase 
This paper—a product of the Environment and Energy Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort in 
the department to study climate change and clean energy issues. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the 
Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at gtimilsina@worldbank.org.  
the monetary cost of travel per trip and are therefore 
politically difficult to implement. However, a noticeable 
finding is that even smaller tolls, which are more likely 
to be politically acceptable, have substantial benefits in 
terms of reducing congestion and emissions. Among 
the various policy instruments examined in the study, 
the most socially preferable policy option for São Paulo 
would be to introduce a mix of congestion toll and fuel 
taxes on automobiles and use the revenues to improve 
public transit systems.   
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Impacts of Policy Instruments to Reduce Congestion and Emissions 
from Urban Transportation: The Case of Sao Paulo, Brazil  
 




São Paulo is the largest city in Brazil and in South America, and the São Paulo metropolitan 
area, with an estimated population of 21,616,060 in 2008 spread over an area of 7,944 square 
kilometers, ranks among the most populous metropolitan areas in the world (Instituto Brasileiro 
de Geografia e Estatística, 2002; 2008).  Sao Paulo is a highly congested and polluted megacity 
due to the rapid increase in car ownership resulting from income growth without adequate 
expansion of road capacity. The city emitted more than 15 million tons of CO2 in 2003, with 
76% of that total from energy use, of which gasoline and diesel combustion accounted for 68%. 
The city government has identified climate change mitigation as a high priority and has 
presented an ambitious proposal to reduce CO2 emissions by 30% by 2012, using both economic 
and fiscal incentives (Goldman, 2008). Moreover, it has been reported that particulate matter 
(PM) and the ozone precursors (nitrogen oxides and volatile organic compounds) from vehicular 
emissions pose a grave threat to local air quality in the São Paulo metropolitan area (Sánchez-
Ccoyllo et al., 2009). 
Vehicular transportation is the primary source of congestion and environmental 
externalities in Sao Paulo as one of the most desirable normal goods is the ownership of a private 
vehicle (Ingram, 1998). Income growth stimulates the demand for car ownership, and with more 
car ownership, congestion and pollution, including CO2 emissions, increase. The increases in 
emissions that could come from some of the developing countries in the future can be staggering, 
due to the enormous urbanization and real income growth that potentially lies ahead. In 
particular, traffic congestion and pollution tends to be worst in the megacities of the rapidly 
developing nations such as China and Brazil (see, for example, Gurjar et. al. 2008).   
With increased urbanization and higher incomes, suburban and exurban sprawl accelerates 
with urban areas spreading out in low density patterns that are believed to favor mobility over 
longer distances by private motorized vehicles rather than by public transit or by bicycle. 
Meanwhile, high densities that can be achieved in urbanized areas support potential investments 
in rail transit systems that could greatly reduce reliance on the automobile, than if the same 3 
 
population were spread over more but smaller cities, each unable to support the economies of 
scale inherent in rail mass transit. Although it is a widely held perception that sprawl in land use 
causes more aggregate car miles to be driven, recent results from modern theoretical models of 
the urban economy in which both jobs and residences decentralize with sprawl (e.g. Anas and 
Rhee, 2006) demonstrate that the total miles driven can actually decrease with sprawl as jobs can 
move closer to workers during the decentralization process. Anas and Pines (2008) have shown 
that pricing congestion can cause population to spread from larger to smaller cities reducing total 
congestion, while increasing the developed land area which corresponds to more sprawl.   
Emissions and fuel use are curbed significantly not only by reductions in the distances 
traveled and in the number of trips made, but also by improving the speed of travel, which in turn 
is determined by the amount of road capacity available to accommodate the demand. Thus any 
policies which can improve the speed of travel in large and highly congested cities could be very 
beneficial in reducing fuel use and emissions, while raising tax revenues that can be used in a 
variety of complimentary ways such as adding mass transit capacity or subsidizing high density 
developments near mass transit lines. Beevers and Carslaw (2005) have studied by means of 
simulation tests whether the congestion charging scheme implemented in central London in 2003 
has resulted in significant speed improvements of about 2.1 km/hour.
3     
We report on results from a highly aggregated model of mode choice in commuting 
representing Sao Paulo in 2002.
4 In that same year, the Brazilian flex-fuel vehicles that run on a 
mixture of alchohol and gasoline were introduced but these did not have a significant market 
share until later. In 2003, a year after the date of our data, flex-fuel vehicles made up only 3.7% 
of the light vehicle market. Therefore, our study is for conditions just before the introduction of 
these vehicles. In the model, the total number of trips per day is fixed as is also the representative 
(average) trip distance. The limited data does not allow us to develop a more sophisticated model 
such as the one for Beijing (see Anas, Timilsina, Zheng, 2009), where the substitutions between 
commuting and non-commuting (discretionary) travel and between travel and housing 
consumption were also included and the number of non-work trips was endogenous. 
                                                 
3 Ultimately, reductions are also driven by fuel technology, and driving simulations of electric cars and hybrids show 
reductions in CO2 emissions  as documented by Saitoh et al (2005). 




Our model incorporates a statistically verified relationship between car speed (km/hr) and 
fuel use per km, and the U.S.E.P.A.’s formula for converting fuel to grams of CO2 per km. We 
use the model to compare the effects of: (1) a socially optimal toll per kilometer of car travel that 
internalizes the excess delays and excess fuel use caused by traffic congestion; (2) a toll on the 
excess delay externality only; and (3) an excise tax on the gasoline used by cars that raises the 
same revenue as the toll on excess delay only, but reduces fuel and emissions by about 1.6 times 
more. Having no data on average incomes by income group in Sao Paulo, we are limited to 
linear-in-income, trip-based indirect utility function. The value of time in commuting is made to 
increase by income group and is assumed proportional to the wage rate, while the sensitivity with 
respect to monetary cost decreases with income. Commuters’ choices are described by a 
trinomial logit model of choice between: (i) private car; (ii) bus and other public transit; (iii) and 
all non-motorized modes such as walking and bicycling. Under these assumptions, we calibrate 
the model so that the elasticities of demand for travel by car with respect to travel cost and travel 
time are reasonable, while the mode-specific constants of the logit model are set to replicate the 
modal shares observed in 2002.  
Because congestion affects speed directly and fuel use indirectly, two congestion 
externalities arise. First, the marginal trip imposes a time delay on other travelers; and second, by 
slowing them down, it causes them to use more fuel per trip. We use the model to calculate the 
socially optimal congestion toll, internalizing both externalities. The optimal toll dramatically 
raises the monetary cost of a car trip by 5.82 times and cuts CO2 by 71%. A partial toll that 
internalizes only the time delay externality is also computed. We show that this partial toll is 
59.2% of the optimal, achieves 75% of the fuel and CO2 reduction, 90% of the revenue and 
86.4% of the welfare gains of the optimal toll, the remaining 13.6% of the welfare gains being 
due to the fuel externality. These results are subjected to extensive sensitivity testing by varying 
the congestion technology, the within income group idiosyncratic taste heterogeneity and a 
coefficient that is used to scale the values of time up or down. Ignoring only the most extreme 
values in these coefficients, the optimal congestion toll reduces CO2 by 60%-87%, and the 
partial toll internalizing only the delay externality reduces CO2 by 40%-74%. Aggregate welfare, 
the sum of consumer surpluses and toll revenue, improves significantly. The consumer surplus of 
higher incomes improves because they value highly the time savings, while that of lower 
incomes decreases. 5 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the simulation model we developed 
for this study followed by presentation of data and key model parameters in section 3. This is 
followed by discussion of key simulation results in section 4. These results show that investing in 
highways, subsidizing transit or improving the fuel economy of cars are not as effective at 
reducing emissions as is taxing car travel. Then, section 5 discusses results of the policy 
simulations demonstrating the effectiveness of taxing car travel. In section 6, we present and 
discuss sensitivity tests on the key parameters, showing that the results on the emission reduction 
potential of taxing travel are quite robust. In section 7, we examine the presence of a “lock-in 
effect” due to highway investment. A lock-in effect exists if increasing road capacity reduces the 
effectiveness of improving transit on aggregate emissions. We do show that there is a lock-in 
effect and that it is indeed quantitatively significant reducing the effectiveness of a 20% transit 
travel time improvement on emissions by about one half, if road capacity is also expanded by 
20%. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper with some policy recommendations.  
2. The model 
 
We will treat the trip choice behavior of six income groups denoted by the subscript  1,...,6 f 
and ordered in increasing income. The disutility function for choosing mode m is assumed to be 
of the form, 
                                      ln fm mm fm f fm u Ug b G E    ,                                       (1) 
where m g  is the monetary cost of travel by mode m (m=1,2,3), where m=3 is auto, m=2 is public 
bus or transit and m=1 is non-motorized transport (bicycles, walking etc.).   m G  is travel time by 





b   (one 
half the wage rate) and reflects that higher income commuters are more sensitive to travel time 
changes than are lower income consumers. Thus, since the marginal utility of monetary travel 
cost is unity across all income groups, the marginal rate of substitution between travel time and 





, which increases with the wage rate  for the same travel time. 
Finally,  fm u  is the idiosyncratic utility by mode m for a particular commuter of income group f. 
Utilizing the usual distributional assumptions about idiosyncratic utilities (namely, i.i.d. 
Gumbel), the mode choices of trips are then described by the following trinomial logit model,  6 
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In (2),  f   is the heterogeneity or (taste dispersion) coefficient of group f and is inversely 
proportional to the identical variance of the idiosyncratic utilities  123 ,,. f ff uuu 
 
From (2) we can also calculate that the elasticity of choosing mode m with respect to 
monetary travel cost  m g  and travel time  m G  are respectively: 
                                                 : (1 )
mm m Pg f fm gP    ,                                             (3a) 
 
                                                     : (1 ) f mm PG f fm b P    .                                              (3b) 
 
Taking the auto mode (m=3) as an example, and keeping  f  the same by f, because the 
probability of choosing auto  3 f P  increases with f, the monetary cost elasticity decreases with 
income (i.e. lower income groups should be more sensitive to monetary cost since they have 
lower budgets) while because the wage rate rises with f (higher income groups should be more 
sensitive to travel time, since they have higher values of time).   
The person trips by mode are calculated as, 
                                 
6
1




                                                      (4) 
In (4),  f N are the total number of person trips per day (commuting and non-commuting) by 
income group f. These daily person trips remain fixed in the model. Then, the sum of motorized 
vehicle traffic in car-equivalent units, is obtained as: 
                                            23 23 aTT Th     ,                                                           (5) 
where  23 ,    are the inverse ratios of vehicle occupancies (car-equivalent buses per bus person-
trip, and fractional cars per person-trip by car respectively) which are used to convert person 
trips to car equivalent vehicular trips after multiplying by h which is the car-equivalent capacity 
load of a whole bus. a=0.5 is the fixed share of bus in the public transit mode. Given an 
aggregate road capacity, Z, the congested round trip travel time per trip is then calculated from 
the Bureau of Public Roads type of congestion function:   7 
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where  3 d  is the given round-trip distance by car in kilometers that remains fixed in the model. 
Car speed then is calculated as  ˆ s: 
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 .                                 (7) 
The fuel expenditure in liters of gasoline per kilometer (assuming a vehicle efficiency of unity) is 
calculated from a polynomial fit to the following statistically verified equation reported by Davis 
and Diegel (2005) for a Geo Prizm (see Figure 1)
5, 
ˆ () f s  (3.78541178/1.6093) [0.122619−0.0117211 ˆ () s  +0.0006413
2 ˆ () s   
−0.000018732
3 ˆ () s  +0.0000003
4 ˆ () s  −0.0000000024718
5 ˆ () s  +0.000000000008233
6 ˆ () s  ]. (8) 
 
FIGURE 1: Fuel consumed per car-km and grams of emissions per car-km. (Plots of 
equations (8) and (13)) 
 
                                                 
5 Davis and Diegel (2004) calculates fuel use in gallons/mile from speed in miles/hour for nine car brands. We 
converted the polynomial equation, that we fitted to their Geo Prizm curve, to the liters/km version by making the 
three required adjustments shown in (8). First, the speed in kilometers/ hour is divided by 1.6903 km/mile in order to 
get the speed in miles/hour. This is then used in the original equation to predict gas consumption in gallons/mile. 
Then, the result is multiplied by 3.785 liters/gallon to get fuel use in liters/mile and, lastly, that result is divided by 












































































The monetary fuel cost per passenger (including fuel taxes) is next calculated from, 
 
                                         3 3 1 ˆ ()
FF FUELC ef sd p        ,                                               (9) 
 
where e is the vehicle efficiency,   F   is the fuel excise tax rate and 
F p is the price of gasoline.
6 
Let MTOLL be a toll charged on each vehicle occupant (i.e. per person-trip) , per kilometer of 
travel, then the monetary cost of a car trip will be:  
                                             3 g FUELC MTOLL   ,                                                         (10) 
 
where 1    if a toll is levied, and  0   if no toll is levied. Tolls that improve economic 
efficiency can be calculated in a variety of ways. One way, for example, is to calculate a 
Pigouvian toll that internalizes the time delays car commuters impose on one another but ignores 
the fact that by slowing each other down, car commuters also decrease their travel speed, thus 
inducing higher fuel consumption. Such a toll per person-trip by car, levied only on the excess 
delay from congestion, would be calculated as 
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,                                        (11) 
where VOT is the (trip-weighted) average value of time of the commuters on the road and the 












and the average travel time,  3, G of that commuter. For the utility function we are using, the VOT 
would be calculated as: 
























                                                (12) 
                                                 
6 The monetary cost of travel depends also on the car’s fuel inefficiency level. However, we have formulated the 
model as if everyone uses a standard efficiency vehicle since we could find no data on how car fuel inefficiency 
varied by income in Sao Paulo (or Brazil, more generally) . From Davis and Diegel (2004), a fuel efficiency of unity 
(e=1 in equation (9)) corresponds very closely to their curve for a Geo Prizm. 
 9 
 
The second curve in Figure 1 is the  2 CO  emissions in grams/km of car travel by taking 
the exponential of a polynomial equation that predicts log-CO2 as a function of the speed in miles 
per hours (Barth and Boriboonsomsin, 2007). The divergence between the fuel and CO2 curves 
occurs because the latter was calculated under cruising conditions in Southern California, 
whereas the curve we fit To Davis and Diegel’s data for the GeoPrizm reflects actual conditions. 
Since cruising speeds are not realistic for Sao Paulo, we use the U.S.E.P.A.’s formula for 
converting a gallon of gasoline to kilograms of CO2.
7    
CO2 grams/gallon = 2,421 grams x 0.99 x (44/12) = 8,788 grams/gallon.                  (13) 
The above completes description of our model’s demand structure and the equations that 
are used to calculate fuel use and emissions. We now turn to how a congested traffic equilibrium 
is calculated using the above equations. 
A congested traffic equilibrium is calculated by the following iterative procedure which, if 
iterated properly and starting from a reasonable starting point, converges robustly and uniquely. 
The steps of the procedure are: 
1.  Set the value of the aggregate car equivalent traffic, T, and call it  ˆ T . 
2.  Calculate the auto travel time,  3, G from the congestion function (6). 
3.  Calculate or input any fuel tax rates and tolls, and then calculate the monetary cost of 
auto, 3, g using (9), (10) (and (11), (12) substituted into (9) in the case of a toll on excess 
delay only).
8 
4.  Calculate the choice probabilities  23 ,, PPfrom (2). 
5.  Calculate  23 ,, TTfrom (4) and T from (5). 
6.  (a) If T and  ˆ T  (from steps 1 and 5) are close enough, stop and declare convergence. The 












                                                 
7 http://www.epa.gov/oms/climate/420f05001.htm#calculating. To calculate the CO2 emissions 
from a gallon of fuel, the carbon emissions are multiplied by the ratio of the molecular weight of CO2 (m.w. 44) to the molecular 
weight of carbon (m.w.12): 44/12. In our case, a further multiplication by 0.75 is required since we assume that 25% of the fuel 
was alcohol. 
8 In the case of the socially optimal toll, (11) and (12) are not used. Instead the value of MTOLL is varied and a 
congested equilibrium is calculated for each MTOLL until we find the value which maximizes social welfare 
(equation (15 )). 10 
 
(b) If  ˆ T  from step 1 is not sufficiently close to the T calculated in step 5, continue 
iterating by returning to step 1, with T from step 5 replacing ˆ T in step 1.  
7.  After convergence, calculate all outputs such as person trips by mode, vehicle kilometers 
traveled by car, total fuel consumption, total carbon emissions, total revenue from tolls or 
fuel taxes etc. and the aggregate value of consumer surplus and social welfare (see 
below). 
Calculation of most model outputs is straightforward, but important outputs of the model are 
the per-capita consumer disutility measure for each income group and the aggregate social 
welfare measure. Note from equation (1) that the marginal utility of income of each income 
group is constant and equal to unity. Then, as it is well known from the properties of the logit 
model, the expected maximum utility (or expected least disutility) of a consumer in income  
group f is REAL valued and given by: 
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  .                       (14) 
Aggregate social welfare is calculated by summing all these BRL-valued consumer surpluses and 
adding the aggregate tax revenues: 
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 3. Data and calibration 
Our data approximate 2002 conditions.
9 The geographic scope of São Paulo in our study is the 
entire metropolitan area, the highest level of aggregation possible. In 2002, the area had a 
population of 18,345,000 and 7,983,000 jobs (43.5% of the population), generating 7,615,000 
commutes per day and 11,716,000 non-work trips per day for a daily total of 19,330,000 trips. In 
2002, the typical car fuel used in Brazil was E25 gasohol (a mixture of 25% alcohol and 75% 
                                                 
9 The source of the data on trips, wages and travel times by mode and income group is the official website of the city 
of São Paulo metropolitan planning agency, Compania do Metropolitano de São Paulo (Metro), in particular   
http://www.metro.sp.gov.br/empresa/pesquisas/afericao_da_pesquisa/afericao_da_pesquisa.shtml  and related 
websites. 11 
 
gasoline). The average prices of alcohol and gasoline were 0.89 and 1.70 BRL/liter respectively, 
resulting in a price for E25 gasohol of 1.50 BRL/liter. The congestion function coefficients were 
set as  0 1/80, c  1 0.15, c  2 2.0 c  . Aggregate highway capacity, Z, was calibrated in such a 
way that, given the 2002 car-equivalent traffic from (4) and (5), the car speed from (7) is the 
24.10 km/hr reported for 2002.
10 The trips were distributed among the six income groups and the 
three modes, according to the data shares in Table 2. Tables 1 and 2 show all the basic data that 
was used in calibrating the model.   
In the trinomial logit (2), the dispersion parameter, , was set to 0.25, the coefficient b in 
the value of time was set at 0.5, and the mode-specific constants for walking set to zero,  while  
set to replicate the public transit and car mode shares for f in Table 2. This calibration resulted in 
car choice elasticity with respect to travel time and monetary cost shown in Table 3, the former 
elasticity increasing with income, the latter decreasing.          
 
















Average trip length (2 way km), n d
a   2.56 35.43 n/a  n/a 20.73 
Trip times (2 way hrs.), n G  
a   0.54 2.10 1.50  1.80
d   0.86 
Speed (km/hr),  33 0.7 ˆˆ ˆ , bus ss s 
b  4.83 16.87 n/a  n/a 24.10 
Fuel expenditure,  3 ˆ () f se , miles/gallon  n/a n/a n/a n/a  24.18 
Fuel price, (BRL/liter), F p  
(E25 gasohol: 25% alcohol at 0.89, 75% 
















b  n/a 37.36 n/a  n/a 1.75 
Traffic load per vehicle, h  n/a  4
e  n/a n/a  1.00 
Average monetary cost of trip per worker 
(BRL/2-way trip),  n g   
0 n/a  n/a  0.77
b  1.73 
                                                 
10 Source: International Association of Public Transport (2007). 12 
 
Notes:
a Survey of the Compania do Metropolitano de Sao Paulo (Metro); 
bMillenium Cities Data Base. IAPT 
(2007);  
c The World Bank; 








TABLE 2: Shares of trips and modes choices by income group 
 
 
Income group  1  2  3 4 5 6  Total or 
Average 
Shares of person trips 
per day, f N  
a  
  
   0.17 
 
      0.25 
 
    0.27 
 
    0.19 
 
     0.09 
   
     0.03 
 
      1.00 
Wage (BRL/hr),  f w
a  





Walk    0.600     0.500     0.400     0.250  0.170  0.150  0.402 
Public    0.300     0.345     0.330     0.300  0.207  0.102  0.305 
Auto    0.100     0.155     0.270     0.450  0.623  0.748  0.293 
Total    1.000     1.000     1.000    1.000 1.000 1.000  1.000 
(Notes: 
a  Survey of the Compania do Metropolitano de Sao Paulo (Metro)) 
 
To achieve a reasonable calibration of the mode choice probabilities, the dispersion 
parameters, f  , are all set to 0.25 and the mode-specific constants for the non-motorized mode in 
the utility function were set to zero ( 1 0 f E  ), while  23 , f f E E  are set to replicate the mode shares 
for f shown in Table 2. This calibration resulted in car choice demand elasticities with respect to 
monetary travel cost and travel time that are shown in Table 3. As discussed earlier and now seen 
from Table 3, the model has been set up in such a way that the elasticity of the probability of 
choosing the car mode with respect to travel time (equation (3b)) increases with income, while 
the elasticity with respect to monetary travel cost (equation (3a)) decreases with income.   
   
TABLE 3: Calibrated own and cross elasticity of mode choice with respect to monetary 
travel cost and travel time of a trip by car 
 
Income group  1 2  3 
 
4 5 6 
Monetary cost 
(equations 3a) 
Own  -0.39 -0.36  -0.32  -0.24 -0.16  -0.11 




4. Considering policies that reduce aggregate fuel use and emissions 
The model ignored some important aspects because data were lacking. Although mode switching 
is treated, the total trips, and the trip distance by mode are fixed. Car fuel economy is uniform in 
the population and although fuel costs are a function of speed, the cost of car acquisition or non-
fuel variable costs are not treated. Still, the model has enough detail to help us learn about how 
pricing policies affect congestion and emissions.  
In Figure 1 where e=1, fuel and emissions per car km are high when speed is low, but each 
falls rapidly with speed, making relatively flat bottoms and rising again at higher speeds.   
Congestion mitigation policies would yield a high return in megacities where the speed is very 
low.  A policy may improve emissions per car km (the intensive margin), but if car trips are 
increased by the policy (the extensive margin), then emissions also increase. We now examine 
this in the case of four policies treatable in the model.  
(i)  Building more roads: Increasing road capacity Z, reduces congestion. But as the  
speed increases, walkers switch to car and bus. The higher speed reduces fuel and emissions per 
car km. Whether aggregate fuel or emissions are reduced depends on the elasticity of car trips 
with respect to travel time. If this elasticity is sufficiently high (low), then trips by car and 
aggregate fuel and emissions increase (decrease). The elasticity shown in Table 3 is low enough 
that a 20% increase in base capacity cuts emissions by 0.95%. 
(ii)  Subsidizing public transit: A lower monetary cost of  bus induces switching to bus 
and a higher car speed, but if a lot more trips switched to bus from walking than from cars, then 
speed can decrease. What happens to the aggregate fuel and emissions depends on the elasticity 
of the trips by bus with respect to the monetary cost of bus. In the present model, by the I.I.A. 
Travel time 
(equations 3b) 
Own  -0.20 -0.38  -0.66  -0.95 -1.27  -1.51 
Cross-bus/walk    0.03    0.07    0.24    0.78    2.10    4.49 14 
 
property of logit equal percentages of car users and walkers switch to bus, but the number 
switching also depends on how many walkers versus how many car users there are to begin with. 
Reducing our base transit money cost by 20% reduces emissions by only 0.40%.   
(iii)  Relaxing vehicle efficiency standards: Making cars more fuel efficient by lowering  
e, keeping car ownership costs unchanged, reduces the per km cost, inducing switches to car 
which raises congestion, reducing speed. If the elasticity with respect to monetary cost is high 
(low) enough, aggregate fuel and emissions increase (decrease) as e is reduced. In our base case, 
improving  e by 20% increases emissions by 5.4%, whereas worsening fuel economy cuts 
emissions by 4.98%. 
(iv)  Reducing congestion by taxing car travel: Taxing each car km, or gasoline per  
liter keeping e constant, induces switches to non-car modes, lowering congestion and increasing 
speed. Aggregate fuel and emissions are reduced unambiguously. An exception, unlikely in 
highly congested megacities, occurs only at very high speeds when the fuel and emissions curves 
rise (Figure 1). The effectiveness of taxing car travel is demonstrated next. 
5. Comparing congestion pricing policies  
Table 4 shows the results of the simulations with the calibrated (base) parameters. Column 1 is 
the base equilibrium in 2002, in which fuel taxes or congestion tolls are not used. Column 2 
shows what would occur if an optimal toll were imposed that internalized both the excess 
congestion delay and the excess fuel consumption externality. This toll is specified as a charge 
per kilometer of car travel per person trip, and its value in (8) is varied until the value which 
maximizes social welfare (12) is found. Column 3 shows the results of the toll specified in (13a), 
(13b) that aims to internalize only the time delay externality of congestion. Column 4 shows the 
percentage of the improvement of the socially optimal toll that is captured by this partial toll 
internalizing only the congestion delay. 15 
 
Fuel use per trip, the monetary cost of fuel and emissions are all reduced, as the tolls add 
a lot more than the fuel cost reduction. The socially optimal toll is 10.07 BRL/trip, but the fuel 
cost per trip falls to 1.29, thus the monetary cost at the optimum is 11.36 or 6.58 times its value 
without tolling. Under the toll on congestion delay only, the toll is 5.96 and the fuel cost 1.37 per 
trip. Thus, the monetary cost of 7.33 per car trip is 4.24 times the base. These large after-tax 
monetary costs cause significant substitution away from auto and in favor of the other modes. 
The optimal toll and the toll on congestion delay decrease emissions by a dramatic 71% and 
53%, respectively. Figure 2 shows how speed increases and CO2 decreases as the toll per km is 
increased. In the case of the optimal toll it takes a 567% increase in the monetary cost per km, to 
reduce CO2 by 75%, a reduction of 0.13%, on average, for every 1% increase in the monetary 
cost per km. The toll on the delay externality only, achieves a 0.18% reduction on average, for 
every 1% increase in monetary cost. The toll internalizing the congestion delay is 59.2% of the 
optimal toll but captures 86.4% of the optimal welfare gain, and 77.3% of the optimal emission 
reduction, while raising 90% of the optimal toll’s revenue. We also calculated that a fuel tax 
which raises the same revenue as the toll on excess delay (but is on the right side of the optimal 
toll, i.e. above optimal) reduces CO2 by 1.6 times more than does the toll on excess delay only. 
This is not shown in the table.   
For each policy, Table 4 shows the consumer surplus per trip for each group, as well as 
its trip weighted average over all groups. Tolling reduces the consumer surplus of the lower 
incomes, since they do not value time savings sufficiently after paying tolls. The two groups with 
the highest incomes, sufficiently value time savings for their consumer surplus to increase after 
paying the toll. The table also shows the social welfare, (12), divided by total trips and the toll 
revenue per day. Figure 3 plots social welfare per trip, average consumer surplus, and aggregate 16 
 
toll revenue against the toll per km. These three curves do not all peak at the same toll. The 
revenue from tolling is maximized at a toll of 9.52 BRL/trip, while the aggregate (or average) 
consumer surplus is maximized at a toll of 12.09 BRL/trip. Social welfare, the sum of total 
revenue and aggregate consumer surplus, peaks at a toll of 10.07 BRL/trip. The curves rise 
relatively steeply, but after peaking, they decline mildly. These properties insure that for any 
revenue level in Figure 3 that is below the peak revenue, the higher-than-optimal toll gives 
higher consumer surplus and social welfare than does the lower-than-optimal toll that raises the 
same revenue. Since CO2 continually decreases with the toll (Figure 2), the higher-than-optimal 
toll also corresponds to lower CO2. Therefore, if one had to choose between the two revenue 
neutral tolls, the higher-than-optimal toll is to be socially preferred. In the context of Figure 3, if 
we wanted to approach the social welfare maximizing optimal toll gradually by increasing the 
targeted revenue in steps, then the present value of social welfare would be maximized by 
starting at the higher-than-optimal toll and then gradually decreasing it towards its optimal value 
by following in reverse the falling part of the social welfare curve. Starting from a low toll and 
then gradually increasing it towards the optimum by following the rising part of the social 
welfare curve would yield a lower present value for social welfare.
11 From Table 4  we also note 
that the aggregate emissions predicted by the base equilibrium (without pricing policies) is 5.83 
million tons per year (obtained by multiplying the daily prediction by 300 assumed average days 
of commuting) which is 78% of the 7.5 million tons per year  reported. The difference we 
presume is from the diesel used in non-car vehicles (e.g. trucks etc) but we are unable to test this 
since we had no data on such vehicles.           
                                                 
11 This fact that revenue peaks at a lower toll than does social welfare is a result of the presence of the bus mode that 
we assume is not tolled and the presence of the non-motorized modes. The presence of these modes cause car 
choices to be reduced more elastically, thus aggregate toll revenue reaches a maximum quickly, whereas the 
switching to the other modes continues to be welfare improving. 17 
 






       
 
Optimal toll on 
excess delay and  
excess fuel 






Toll on excess  
delay only 
 






Percent of  
optimal change 
from base captured  
by toll on delay only 
 
Speed (km/hr)   24.10  51.27  39.89  58.1 
Auto person trips
6 (1 0)    5.6745 
2.2096 3.3528 
67.0 
Bus person trips 
6 (1 0)     5.8861 
9.0790           7.9720 
65.0 
Auto vehicle kil. 




6 (1 0)     4.8801 
0.8933 1.7423 
78.7 
Auto fuel (liters) 
7 (1 0)      
1.1431            0.3331  0.5371 
 
74.6 
Auto CO2 mill. tons/year  5.8330  1.6997  2.7407  74.6 
Car equiv. traffic 
6 (1 0)     3.5577 
1.7487 2.3427 
67.2 
Fuel cost/trip (BRL)  1.7272  1.2928  1.3735  81.4 
Toll/trip (BRL)      0      10.07  5.9636  59.2 
Consumer surplus/trip     6.9595     7.2217  7.1459  71.1 
f=1    2.5979     2.3469   2.3819  86.0 
f=2    3.8817     3.6057   3.6345  89.5 
f=3    5.8834     5.5607    5.5977  88.5 
f=4    9.7969     9.8001           9.8151  105.7 
f=5  15.4063  17.5192         17.1637  83.2 
f=6  22.3769  30.4549         28.3891  74.4 
Social welfare./trip     6.9595    8.3728  8.1803  86.4 
Revenue /day 
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6. Sensitivity analysis 
We now want to see how robust the response of aggregate emissions to congestion pricing is 
under widely different parameter values. For this purpose, the most important parameters of the 
model are selected. These are: (i)  2 c , exponent of the congestion technology, (6), which controls 
the sensitivity of traffic speed to the ratio of traffic to road capacity. The severity of the 
congestion externalities increases with 2 c ; (ii) the idiosyncratic taste heterogeneity parameter . 
From (3a), (3b), this parameter controls the sensitivity of the demands for mode to the monetary 
cost and to travel time. By decreasing   toward zero, the sensitivity is reduced and demands 











with wage, are changed together for all  f  by changing the divisors from 2 to some other number. 






b   to keep  f b  constant has the effect of increasing sensitivity to monetary 
cost relative to the sensitivity to travel time.    
6.1 Congestion technology ( 2 c ) 
When 2 c , congestion increases, speed decreases and, consequently, trips by car decrease. Since 
the lower speed works to raise emissions per kilometer, while the fewer trips by car work to 
decrease emissions, aggregate emissions can change non-monotonically with 2 c , but have a 
decreasing trend in Table 5. This is interesting because it shows that a city with  2 0 c  has no 
congestion but more emissions than an otherwise identical city with  2 4. c   In the latter case, the 
higher road congestion induces more walking and transit trips causing lower aggregate 20 
 
emissions, even though emissions per car-km increase. Conversely, the emission reductions per 
car-km from the higher speed in the uncongested city are more than offset by the added 
emissions from more car trips. With higher 2 c , the gap between the marginal social and average 
private cost of travel gets wider and a higher toll is required to internalize the externality due to 
the time delay or the time delay and the fuel use externalities together (optimum toll). Tolls 
increase and CO2 decreases monotonically with  2 c . CO2 reductions from tolling increase with  2 c  
(reaching 88% when 2 4 c  ). These results show that tolling is much more effective in cities with 
poor congestion technology. As 2 c  increases, tolling only for the delay externality captures an 
increasing part of the optimal improvement in emissions (reaching 92.6% when 2 c =4), because 
with higher  2 c , the time delay externality becomes large relative to the fuel cost externality.  




          
No Congestion Tolling    Optimum Tolling  Tolling Delay Externality 
CO2 















0.0 5.7492  69.56  5.674  0  0.00  0  0.00 
1.0 5.4562  44.70  4.072  33.38  3.56  22.24 2.18 
2.0 5.8830  24.10  3.2353  75.72  10.07  57.99 5.96 
3.0 5.5230  17.00  4.0716  84.78  14.16  74.53 9.68 
4.0 5.0663  13.97  3.2353  87.83  16.55  81.34 12.52 
 
6.2 Taste heterogeneity ( ) 
 is the inverse of the variance of the idiosyncratic tastes within each income group. From (3a)-
(3b) when 0   , all own and cross elasticity is zero. The idiosyncratic tastes are so large that 
choices are random and each mode has one third share. The demand for car is perfectly inelastic, 
so tolls cannot change behavior and cannot improve aggregate welfare because the decrease in 
consumer surplus caused by the toll is exactly offset by the toll revenue. The case of  0.001   in 
Table 6 comes very close to 0   . The optimal toll reduces emissions by only 1.6%. As is 21 
 
increased, idiosyncratic heterogeneity decreases and choices become increasingly sensitive to 
monetary and time cost differences between the modes, making tolls more effective in reducing 
congestion and emissions.  For example, when  1.25    or 1.50, the optimal toll reduces 
emissions by 81%. At even higher , idiosyncratic variation diminishes and choices are 
concentrated on a single mode. When  10   the lowest three income groups all walk, and the 
highest three all choose car. No one chooses public transit. To induce efficient changes in this 
extreme situation, the toll begins to rise with .    





               
No Congestion Tolling    Optimum Tolling  Tolling Delay Externality 
CO2 















0.001 7.6549  20.18 6.4348 1.62  12.21  0.56 4.17 
0.01 7.4727  20.51  6.3600 14.35  11.89  5.27  4.18 
0.15 6.1206  23.41  5.7731 68.66  10.21  45.86  5.16 
0.25 5.8830  24.10  5.6744 75.72  10.07  57.99  5.96 
0.50  5.8369  24.49  5.6994 79.48    9.83  67.93  6.67 
0.75  5.9411  24.45  5.7950 80.83    9.79  71.14  6.85 
1.00  6.0441  24.38  5.8821 81.29    9.82  72.79  6.93 
1.25  6.1191  24.34  5.9473 81.44    9.86  73.72  6.97 
1.50  6.1631  24.35  5.9921 81.47    9.90  74.21  6.99 
5.00 5.9513  25.40  5.9756 81.40  10.30  73.56  7.07 
10.00 5.9204  25.54 5.9691 81.61  10.41  73.40  7.0988 
 




Table 7 shows that as bf  increases, car trips increase initially, decreasing after bf  = 0.75wf. 
Correspondingly, speed decreases as car trips increase and then begins to increase. Because the 
speed reduction is dominated by the initial increase in car trips, emissions roughly follow the car 
trips, rising initially and then falling. Why do car trips first rise and then fall, as the value of time 
increases? Since public transit is the slowest mode, increasing the value of time from zero 
induces marginal transit users to switch to car, and more so the higher their wage. At the same 22 
 
time, walking is faster than car on average (not because of speed but because those who walk 
choose shorter distances to their destinations). Hence, increasing the value of time induces 
marginal car users to switch to walking arrangements while marginal transit riders switch to 
walking or to car. Initially as bf increases, more switch from transit to car than from car to 
walking and car trips increase, causing more congestion and emissions. As bf increases more 
there is a reversal and more switch from car to walking than from transit to car, and car trips and 
emissions decrease. Looking at policy, when bf=0, no one cares about time and the delay 
externality vanishes. The toll is 0.48 BRL/trip and is due to the fuel externality. As bf  increases, 
the delay externality grows and the optimal toll or the toll monetizing the delay increase 
dramatically. In all cases except bf=0, optimal tolling reduces base emissions 63% to 76%. The 
reduction captured by monetizing the delay rises with bf, reaching 90% when bf =6. 







       
No Congestion Tolling    Optimum Tolling  Tolling Delay Externality 
CO2 
















  f w 0.0  3.4166  32.0  4.0570 12.43  0.48  0  0.00 
f w 0.25  5.0176  26.0  5.1352 66.18  5.40  40.08  2.46 
f w 0.50  5.8831  24.1  5.6743 75.72 10.07  57.99  5.96 
f w 0.75  5.7707  24.8  5.6909 75.28 14.18  62.50  9.36 
f w 1.00  5.4284  26.1  5.5638 73.94 17.78  63.22  12.37 
f w 1.50  4.8761  28.4  5.3164 71.57 24.28  62.68  17.66 
f w 2.00  4.4933  30.0  5.1398 69.69 30.61  61.50  22.54 
f w 4.00  3.9231  33.4  4.7892 65.78 57.17  59.33  40.90 




6.4 Sensitivity to monetary cost ( relative to b  f ) 
When is increased while bf  is simultaneously lowered so that the monetary cost elasticity of car 
demand (equation (3a)) becomes larger relative to the time elasticity (equation (3b)), fewer trips 
choose car since time savings from switching to car are valued less, but the monetary savings 
from switching from car to walking and transit are valued more. Since the sensitivity to money 
cost is higher, a lower toll is required to achieve a certain reduction in CO2 or to reach the 
optimum. With a 20% increase in the base  (and a 20% decrease in bf ), the social welfare 
maximizing toll drops from 10.07 to 8.45 per person trip by car, but emissions are still cut by 
75%, a 0.13% cut for every 1% increase in the monetary cost of driving. Doubling the base  
(while halving bf ), the optimal toll drops to 4.76, but emissions are still cut by 74%, a 0.2% cut 
for every 1% rise in monetary cost. In these two changes, the toll on the delay externality is 
58.6% and 55% of the optimal toll respectively.            
 
7. Observing the lock-in effect from expanding highway capacity 
Table 8 shows the results of additional simulations to reveal some insights related to 
infrastructure lock-in effects. These simulations are designed to demonstrate that expanding 
highway capacity reduces the effectiveness of transit improvements. That is, expanding road 
capacity locks-in a situation in which subsequent expansions of transit level of service would not 
be as effective in reducing gasoline consumption or CO2 emissions. Each simulation changes a 
key variable and compares the results to a base situation.  
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TABLE 8: Effects of the improvements on the aggregates and the lock-in effect 
 
  Base  Expansion of road 
capacity 
(Z increased 20%) 
Improvement of 
transit travel time 
( 2 G decreased 20%) 
Road expansion  
and transit 
improvement  
Car equivalent traffic 
6 ,10  
2.4326 2.6729 +9.98% 2.359
 
-3.0%  2.5943  +6.65%
Car person trips, 
6 ,10  
3.603 4.0632 +12.77% 3.3725
 
-6.40%  3.8339  +6.41%
Bus person trips 
6 ,10  
3.7373 3.5112 -6.05% 4.3185
 
+15.55%  4.0348  +7.96%
Car travel time (hours)
6 ,10  
3.0906 3.092 +0.05% 2.7724
 
-10.30%  2.8058  -9.22%
Car vehicle kilometers
7 ,10  
7.4484 8.3998 +12.77% 6.9719
 
-6.40%  7.9258  +6.41%
Fuel used by cars (liters)
6 ,10  
7.2393 7.6184 +5.24% 6.6064
 
-8.74%  7.0401  -2.75%
CO2 emitted by cars (mil.tons/yr)  
4.6059 4.7434 +2.98% 4.1732
 
-9.40%  4.3487  -5.59%
Speed of car travel (km/hr)  
24.1 27.2 +12.77% 25.15
 
+4.35%  28.25  +17.21%
 
 
In order to properly capture the lock-in effect, four simulations needed to be done and the 
results are shown in the corresponding columns of Table 8. The first is a base simulation 
representing the calibrated state corresponding to 2002. The second column shows what happens 
if highway capacity is expanded by 20%. Speed, aggregate vehicle-kilometers and trips by car all 
increase by 12.7%, bus trips decrease by 6%, and car equivalent traffic increases by 9.8%. The 
aggregate travel time of those commuting by car increases only slightly by 0.04%, reflecting the 
effect of the road capacity expansion. Fuel consumption increases by 5.2% and CO2 emissions 
by almost 3%. As expected, improving transit (column 3 of Table 8) has oppositely signed 
effects, except on car speed which increases as people switch from cars to the less congesting 
buses in larger numbers than walkers and cyclists switch to buses. In fact, the 20% improvement 
in bus travel time increases car speed by 1/3 as much as increasing road capacity by 20% did. 
Note that fuel consumption and emissions decrease by around nine percent. Now in the last step 
the road capacity improvement and the transit travel time improvement are introduced 
simultaneously. In this case note that emissions improve relative to base but by about 5.6% 
instead of the 9.4% improvement that occurred when transit had no competition from road 
improvements. In the case of fuel the reduction in the presence of highway improvements is 25 
 
2.75% instead of 8.74%. It is clear, therefore, that the lock-in effect is important quantitatively 
for fuel use as well as for emissions. 
8. Conclusions and further remarks 
    
In this study we examined the welfare impacts of some policy instruments (e.g., tolls on excess 
delays, fuel tax, improving fuel economy standards, etc.) to reduce congestion and atmospheric 
emissions in Sao Paulo, Brazil. We employed a trinomial logit model that is capable of capturing 
the modal switching between walking, public transit and auto. The simulations reveal a number 
of findings that could help governments and city planners in designing policies to reduce 
transport sector externalities in megacities like Sao Paulo. These findings are summarized below: 
 
  Expanding roads, subsidizing transit and improving car fuel economy may not be as 
effective as suggested by economic theories because these policies could cause rebound 
effects. For example, building more roads improves speed which reduces emissions from 
existing car trips, but it also attracts new car trips from the other modes which can cause 
the aggregate emissions to rise.  Improving transit fares reduces emissions by attracting 
trips from cars, but it also attracts the trips of those who walked and if the latter effect is 
stronger, this may cause more buses on the roads increasing congestion. Improving the 
fuel economy of cars at least initially makes the fuel and therefore the monetary cost of 
driving a km cheaper. Although this cuts emissions from existing car trips, if more car 
trips are induced by the cheaper per km cost, then congestion and total emissions can 
increase. Our simulations reveal that a 20% expansion of road capacity would lower 
emissions by 0.95%; a 20% subsidy in public transit would result in 0.40% emission 
reduction and a 20% improvement in fuel economy standards would reduce emissions by 
approximately 5%.    
  
  Pricing instruments such as tolls on excess delays, fuel tax etc. would certainly reduce 
congestion and emissions. But, optimal taxes on road travel steeply increase the monetary 
cost of travel per trip and are therefore politically difficult to implement. However, a 26 
 
noticeable finding is that even smaller tolls that are more likely to be politically 
acceptable, have substantial benefits in terms of reducing congestion and emissions.  
 
  The toll, which is socially optimum for Sao Paulo, is estimated to be 10.07 BRL/trip. 
Although this raises the monetary cost of a trip by 6.57 times, it would reduce 
atmospheric emissions dramatically, 75%. The large increases in the monetary cost per 
trip due to these taxes induce significant substitutions away from auto and in favor of 
public motorized and other (non-motorized) modes, causing large decreases in fuel use 
and CO2 emissions; a reduction of 0.13%, on average, for every 1% increase in the 
monetary cost per km. 
 
  It would be socially preferable to use the daily revenue from these taxes which is about 
14.6 million BRL per day, in improving transit rather than building roads. A 20% 
increase in highway capacity about halves the emission reductions that a 20% 
improvement in transit travel times could achieve in the absence of the highway 
improvment. Building roads would make future transit expansions less productive in 
reducing emissions. We refer to this finding as the lock-in effect or road investment.  
 
Although the model used in the study is highly aggregated, it does show certain results 
that enrich our understanding of how pricing aimed at congestion and fuel externalities improve 
welfare, raise revenue and reduce fuel use and emissions. In a more disaggregated setting, such 
as one involving several geographic areas connected by a highway network, important 
differences between congestion tolling and fuel taxing are certain to emerge. In such a 
disaggregated setting, the optimal tolls will vary by highway, whereas the fuel tax would be a flat 
tax per liter regardless of the congestion and excess fuel externalities created by the driver. 
Therefore, in a more disaggregated analysis, the fuel tax would emerge as an inferior measure for 
controlling traffic externalities and could achieve significantly lower social welfare 
improvements. However, because the fuel tax is aimed directly at pricing fuel use, it will likely 
remain a more effective tool for reducing energy utilization and emissions, but at the cost of 
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